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IN THE UTAH COl 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
QRT OF APPEALS 
CaseNo.20020966-CA 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A Statute's Unconstitutionality is a Jurisdictional Defect. Upon entering his 
guilty pleas in this case, Appellant, Richard Norris ("Mr. Norris") waived only non-
jurisdictional defects. Although a guilty plea waives claims of constitutional violations 
alleged to have occurred prior to a guilty plea (i.e. unlawful search and seizure), jurisdic-
tional claims are an exception to this general rule. It is sound reasoning and well settled 
in federal courts that a challenge to a statute's constitutionality is a direct challenge to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court, and that a statute's unconstitutionality divests the trial court 
of jurisdiction. Mr. Norris is challenging the constitutionality of the communications 
fraud statute, specifically alleging that it is overbroad and void for vagueness; thus Mr. 
Norris is directly challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court. Therefore, Mr. Norris did 
not waive his right to appeal his convictions when he entered guilty pleas in this case. 
The Overbreadth of the Statute is Both Real and Substantial. In scrutinizing 
legislation that places limits upon the free exercise of speech, it is critical to recognize 
that it is the statute, and not the specific facts of the individual case, which prescribes the 
limits of lawful conduct. Therefore, regardless of the facts of a specific case, if a statute 
restricts constitutionally protected conduct in a manner that is both real and substantial, it 
is unconstitutionally overbroad regardless of any legitimate application. The United 
States Supreme Court has determined that the First Amendment to the federal constitution 
affords some protection to falsehoods, recognizing that some falsehoods must be pro-
tected in a society that values and protects free speech. However, the broad and sweeping 
language of the communications fraud statute criminalizes all falsehoods, whether those 
falsehoods are conveyed by omission or commission, directly or indirectly, employing 
merely false or insincere behavior, for the purpose of obtaining anything of value. 
Vagueness Encourages Arbitrary and Discriminatory Enforcement The 
communications fraud statute contains words and phrases that are not readily understood 
by persons of ordinary intelligence. Examples illustrating the genuine difficulties 
inherently associated with interpreting such terms as "artifice" or "anything of value" 
previously set forth in Mr. Norris's BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Br. Appt") were not 
"hypertechnical" figments of the imagination, as the state suggests. Rather, they were 
common scenarios that occur in everyday life which illustrate how certain prevalent yet 
diverse and often harmless behavior can easily fit within the punishing parameters of the 
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communications fraud statute. Moreover, because the statute is so vague, it not only 
permits, but it encourages arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A STATUTE'S UNCONSTITUTIONALITY IS A JURISDICTIONAL 
DEFECT THAT DIVESTS THE TRIAL COURT OF JURISDICTION. 
The state claims that Mr. Norris waived his right to appeal the constitutionality 
of Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 when he pleaded guilty in this case. The state further 
cites as dispositive the language in State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275 (Utah 1989) (quoted 
in State v. Hardy, 54 P.3d 645, 648 (Utah Ct. App. 2002)1) which provides that a defen-
dant who pleads guilty "waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged pre-plea 
constitutional violations." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1278 (emphasis added). The 
state also concedes that Mr. Norris is not precluded from challenging the trial court's 
jurisdiction. Not only is the state's argument flawed, but its position is inconsistent with 
the very authority it cites. 
!In State v. Hardy, the defendant entered into a plea in abeyance agreement on a 
misdemeanor charge. He was later convicted for felonious violations of a protective 
order which were also hejd to be in violation of the terms of the plea in abeyance 
agreement, and resulted in him being sentenced on both the misdemeanor and the 
subsequent felonies. Appealing his convictions on the basis that the controlling statute 
was unconstitutional, this Court determined that the defendant waived any challenge to 
any constitutional defects when he pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor. However, it does 
not appear that the defendant in that case raised the issue that a statute's 
unconstitutionality is a jurisdictional defect. Accordingly, it does not appear that this 
Court has ever addressed this specific question. 
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Although it does not appear that this issue has been directly addressed in Utah 
appellate courts, the rationale underlying the wise and widely adopted principle that an 
unconstitutional law deprives a court of jurisdiction is supported by Utah Code Ann. §78-
3-4(1), which bestows jurisdiction upon the district courts "in all matters . . . not excepted 
in the [state] Constitution and not prohibited by law (emphasis added). Presumably, a 
statute that is unconstitutional is, by definition, excepted by the Constitution. Moreover, 
it is clearly prohibited by constitutional law, thereby depriving the district courts of 
jurisdiction as a matter of law. 
Federal precedent provides additional support to this conclusion and further 
clarifies identical principles already adopted, if not yet fully addressed, by Utah courts. 
Using language strikingly similar to that set forth in Parsons above and relied upon by the 
state as "dispositive" in this case (BRIEF OF APPELLEE ("Br. Appe.") at 6), the Ninth 
Circuit Court clarified the distinction between "pre-plea constitutional violations" and 
"jurisdictional claims": "Although a guilty plea generally waives all claims of constitu-
tional violation occurring before the plea, 'jurisdictional' claims are an exception to this 
rule." United States v. Caperell, 938 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting United States 
v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1989), amended at 907 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1990). In 
other words, constitutional claims that are also jurisdictional are not waived by a guilty 
plea. 
As further clarification, the same court stated plainly that "claims that the 
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applicable statute is unconstitutional or that the indictment fails to state an offense are 
jurisdictional claims not waived by the guilty plea." United States v. Montilla, 870 F.2d 
at 552 (quoting United States v. Broncheau, 597 F.2d 1260, 1261 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1979), cert, 
denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979)). In other words, a guilty plea waives pre-plea constitutional 
non-jurisdictional violations, such as an unlawful search and seizure, but not constitu-
tional claims that by their nature, divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the matter. 
Several other courts have consistently followed this same sound reasoning, and 
in many of these cases, the United States Supreme Court declined to review. See, United 
States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 998 (1989); 
United States v. Skinner, 25 F.3d 1314 (6th Cir. 1994); O'Leary v. United States, 856 F.2d 
1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1998); United States v. DiFonzo, 603 F.2d 1260, 1263 (7th Cir. 
1979), cert, denied, 444 U.S. 1018 (1980). 
Moreover, the Due Process Clause contained in the Fifth Amendment to the 
federal constitution proves problematic when the government obtains a conviction under 
an unconstitutional statute, or via the unconstitutional application of a statute. The 
practical effect of the Due Process Clause in such a circumstance is to simply deprive the 
trial court of jurisdiction from the outset and invalidate the conviction. For example, in 
Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974), a defendant residing in North Carolina pleaded 
guilty to a misdemeanor and was then subsequently convicted by a jury of a felony 
offense for the same conduct, in violation of prohibitions against double jeopardy. The 
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high court stated that because of the constitutional violations inherent in the second 
prosecution, "the very initiation of the proceedings against [the defendant] . . . thus 
operated to deny him due process of law. . . . The 'practical result' dictated by the Due 
Process Clause in this case is that North Carolina simply could not require Perry [the 
defendant] to answer to the felony charge." Id. at 30-31. 
The ultimate result in Blackledge v. Perry would have been no different if Perry 
had pleaded guilty to the charges in the second prosecution, because the constitutional 
violations, and thus the due process deprivations, are identical in both circumstances. In 
either scenario, the district court ultimately lacked jurisdiction over the unconstitutional 
prosecution and conviction of the second case. Yet if the state's arguments in this case 
were adopted, a defendant who pleaded guilty twice to the same offense would be 
precluded from challenging the second conviction under the procedural facts of this case. 
Because a statute's unconstitutionality is a jurisdictional defect, Mr. Norris's 
guilty pleas do not preclude him from raising his constitutional challenges on appeal. 
II. THE COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD STATUTE IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
A. SECTION 76-10-1801 FAILS TO REGULATE WITH NARROW 
SPECIFICITY. 
The state argues that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 only prohibits falsehoods 
made (or omitted) knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, and 
that such are not protected by the First Amendment. Although courts generally afford 
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statutes a strong presumption of constitutionality, they "will not infer substantive terms 
into the text that are not already there. Rather, the interpretation must be based on the 
language used, and [courts have] no power to rewrite the statute to conform to an 
intention not expressed. . . . Further, because First Amendment freedoms need breathing 
space to survive, government may regulate in the area only with narrow specificity." 
IML. v. State, 2002 UT 110, f25, 61 P.3d 1038 (citations omitted). 
The state concedes that an overbroad statute that prohibits both protected and 
unprotected behavior may be facially invalid, regardless of its legitimate application to 
the facts in a specific case. Br. Appe. at 10. Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is overbroad 
because it imposes criminal sanctions for all falsehoods, rather than regulating with 
narrow specificity. Thus it prohibits constitutionally protected conduct in a manner that 
is both real and substantial. Notably, the state does not dispute Mr. Norris's claim that the 
communications fraud statute prohibits all communications made with at least a reckless 
disregard for the truth.2 Indeed, the crux of the state's argument with regard to 
overbreadth is simply that any false communications made intentionally, knowingly, or 
with a reckless disregard for the truth are not protected by the First Amendment. 
Accordingly, given the undisputed fact that a scheme or artifice to obtain anything of 
value is presumed to exist when any false communications are made, the narrow issue for 
2Mr. Norris has previously argued that a falsehood or lie presumes the existence of 
a scheme or artifice to at least obtain anything of value, and the state has not disputed this 
argument. 
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purposes of this appeal is whether any falsehoods made with the requisite intent are 
protected by the federal and state constitutions. 
B. SECTION 76-10-1801 CRIMINALIZES ALL FALSEHOODS, 
SOME OF WHICH ARE EXPRESSLY PROTECTED BY THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT. 
From the outset, the state concedes that "the First Amendment affords a measure 
of protection to 'some' falsehoods in order to provide breathing space necessary" for free 
exercise of protected speech. Br. Appe. at 13-14. Indeed, "[t]he First Amendment 
requires that we protect some falsehoods in order to protect speech that matters." Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (emphasis added). Any legislative enact-
ment that violates the First Amendment cannot be justified on the basis that "such 
limitation [is] intimately related to substantial government interest in preventing fraud and 
protecting public safety . . ." Village ofSchaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 
445 U.S. 972 (1980); see also, Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) 
(holding that a municipality may not enact regulations in the interest of public safety, 
health, welfare or convenience that abridge individual liberties secured by the constitu-
tion). Legislation that imposes criminal liability for all falsehoods is not only overbroad 
such that it abridges protected speech in a manner that is both real and substantial, it is 
unwise. 
"Although the erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional 
protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free debate. As James Madison 
pointed out in the Report on the Virginia Resolutions of 1798: 'Some degree of 
abuse is inseparable from the proper use of every thing; and in no instance is this 
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more true than in that of the press.' 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitut-
ion of 1787, p. 571 (1876)." 
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. at 340. However, citing New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the state argues that such "breathing space" does not 
extend to falsehoods made knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the 
truth. Br. Appe. at 14. This conclusion is problematic for the state for several reasons. 
The falsehoods at issue in an action for defamation of a public figure, such as 
those in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, are not provided constitutional protection if 
made with actual malice, or in other words knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth. However, the state's reliance on New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 
does not address the glaring fact that (1) not all falsehoods are defamatory; and (2) by 
definition, all falsehoods are made either knowingly, intentionally, or with a reckless 
disregard for the truth and encompass at least an artifice to obtain anything of value. 
"Falsehood" is defined as "deception," "the telling of lies; lying," "lack of 
honesty," "treachery," "dishonesty," "deceitfulness," "perfidy." WEBTERS NEW UNIVER-
SAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY, Second Edition (1983), p. 661. If a person conveys a 
false impression unknowingly, unintentionally, or without at least a reckless disregard for 
the truth, they may be mistaken, but not dishonest, not treacherous, not deceitful, nor a 
liar. In other words, they have not communicated a falsehood; rather, they have commu-
nicated perhaps a misunderstanding. The definition of "falsehood" therefore presupposes 
an intent or scienter often exceeding a reckless disregard for the truth. A falsehood is a 
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lie, not a mistake. Indeed, it is easy to conceive of several examples of non-defamatory 
and relatively harmless falsehoods made knowingly and intentionally. 
The state also does not deny Mr. Norris's claim that §76-10-1801 prohibits all 
falsehoods, defamatory or otherwise; and "[w]here regulations of liberty of free discus-
sion are concerned, there are special reasons for observing the rule that it is the statute, 
and not the accusation or the evidence under it, which prescribes the limits of permissible 
conduct and warns us against transgression." Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 98 
(1939). The understanding that a "falsehood" cannot exist without at least a reckless 
disregard for the truth compels the conclusion that even some falsehoods made know-
ingly, intentionally, or with a reckless disregard for the truth, are protected speech, since 
by definition, all falsehoods are made with specific intent. 
A definition of "artifice" was also set forth in Mr. Norris's Brief, and includes 
"false or insincere behavior." Given this definition, a falsehood is an artifice, because the 
making of a falsehood necessarily entails false or insincere behavior. Further, it is only 
logical to conclude that a person who knowingly perpetuates a falsehood does so for the 
purpose of obtaining "anything of value", in light of the broad and vague meaning of such 
a subjective term. Thus, because all falsehoods are made with specific intent, encompass 
an artifice, and seek some subjective value, §76-10-1801 criminalizes all falsehoods. 
Indeed, the bigger challenge is to conceive of a falsehood that does not fit within the 
broad parameters of the communications fraud statute. 
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Because the communications fraud statute criminalizes all falsehoods or lies, 
defamatory or otherwise, and in a manner that is both real and substantial, it is unconstitu-
tionally overbroad. Moreover, although the state cites authority for the proposition that a 
statute will not be deemed facially invalid if it is readily subject to a limiting construction 
(Br. Appe. at 11), the state provides no example of such a limiting construction or any 
guidance as to how a limiting construction might be developed and applied to the 
unconstitutionally overbroad provisions of the communications fraud statute. 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, the Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1801 is 
unconstitutionally overbroad. 
IIL SECTION 76-10-1801 IMPLICATES CONSTITUTIONALLY PRO-
TECTED SPEECH; NOTWITHSTANDING, IT IS IMPERMISSIBLY 
VAGUE IN ALL OF ITS APPLICATIONS 
Mr. Norris has already addressed the manner in which the communications fraud 
statute implicates protected speech in the previous section. Accordingly, he will not 
reiterate those arguments but incorporates them herein by reference. Notwithstanding, 
§76-10-1801 is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. A statute is void for 
vagueness if persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning. 
Provo City v. Thompson, 44 P.3d 828, 834 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted). A 
statute which fails to adequately notice prohibited conduct is unconstitutionally vague. 
State v. Morrision, 31 P.3d 547, 553 (Utah 2001). Further, "to avoid chilling the exercise 
of vital First Amendment rights, restriction of expression must be expressed in terms 
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which clearly inform citizens of prohibited conduct and in terms susceptible of objective 
measurement." I.M.L. v. State, 460 Utah Adv. Rep. at |^25 (citations omitted) (emphasis 
added). "[A] statute, which readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement 
by local prosecuting officials, against a particular group [or individual] deemed to merit 
their displeasure, results in a continuous and pervasive restraint on all freedom of 
discussion that might reasonably be regarded as within its purview." Thornhill v. 
Alabama, 310 U.S. at 97-8. 
Section 76-10-1801 provides that a scheme or artifice to defraud or to obtain 
"anything of value" meets the requirements of the statute. The term "anything of value" 
cannot be objectively measured, as required for a statute to survive constitutional scrutiny 
The term "value" by itself is a vague, broad, relative and subjective term3; and under the 
plain language of the statute, "anything" of value is fair game. For example, a wife may 
obtain value, simply because she esteems it as such, when she intentionally lies to her 
husband to facilitate her extramarital affair. Because the value sought via her scheme or 
artifice is not susceptible to objective measurement, her admittedly intentional dishonesty 
constitutes a second degree felony, exposing her to a punishment of 1-15 years in prison 
and a fine of up to $10,000. £ven if the state, perhaps out of the kindness of its discre-
3
"Value" is defined as "fair price", "the equivalent of something in money", "that 
quality of a thing according to which it is thought of as being more or less desirable, 
useful, estimable, important,", "that which is desirable or worthy of esteem for its own 
sake; thing or quality having intrinsic worth", "valued". WEBSTERS, supra, p 2018. 
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tionary heart, declined to prosecute the offender, it is this very potential for arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement that makes a statute void for vagueness, and provides yet 
another reason why the communications fraud statute melts under the fervent heat of 
constitutional scrutiny. 
The state does not dispute or address the fact that §76-10-1801 requires no intent 
to defraud. Rather, the state ignores this troubling fact and cites Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703 (1950), suggesting that the imagination might conceive of any number of 
hypothetical scenarios to stretch the meaning of any statutory term beyond reason. Br. 
Appe. at 17. In the Hill case, the appellant challenged the constitutionality of a Colorado 
ordinance that prohibited anyone from approaching, within 8 feet, another person for the 
purpose of engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling, without the approached 
person's consent. The Supreme Court held that the terms of the ordinance were not vague 
because persons of common intelligence would understand the conduct prohibited. Hill 
argued that the term "approaching" was unconstitutionally vague, disingenuously opining 
that the term did not clarify whether a person's outstretched arm might impermissibly 
breach the imposed 8-foot boundary. Understandably dismissing the appellant's conten-
tion as "hypertechnicaL" the Supreme Court rejected the claim that the statute would not 
be understood by ordinary persons, explaining that "because we are condemned to the use 
of words, we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." Id. at 732-33. 
In Hill, the ordinance set a specific, narrow, objectively measurable 8-foot "value," as it 
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were. In stark contrast, §76-10-1801 significantly broadens the prosecutorial possibilities 
with its subjective and therefore unmeasurable "anything of value," particularly taken in 
the context of the additionally vague "indirect" "conveying" of false information via 
"material omission" to further an "artifice" (i.e., false or insincere behavior). Indeed, the 
state could not have picked a better contrast in the Colorado ordinance challenged in Hill 
to the statute at issue in this case. 
The state claims that the statutory terms "artifice," "communicate," and 
"anything of value" are not vague, despite the fact that the state does not dispute Mr. 
Norris's claim that the broad language of the statute effectively criminalizes all false-
hoods made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. First, the state claims that the term 
"artifice" is understood by people of common intelligence. Br. Appe. at 16. This claim is 
perhaps somewhat disingenuous. The term "artifice" is not generally used in common, 
every day speech. Most ordinary people would likely require a dictionary to obtain the 
common meaning.4 
Likwise, the term "communicate" is not simply overbroad, but it is also vague. 
Although at least the statute attempts to define this term, the term "communicate" is 
nonetheless defined using vague terms that persons of common intelligence would 
4This fact is evidence by the record in a companion case, State v. Mattinson, Case 
No. 20030474-CA, when during deliberations, the jury requested a definitions for 
"anything of value" and "artifice," apparently concluding that the defendant's conduct did 
not constitute a scheme to defraud, thus requiring them to determine if it was an artifice to 
obtain anything of value. 
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interpret differently. As the state concedes, "communicate" includes every conceivable 
form of communication, and is defined as simply as to "convey" or "transmit informa-
tion." UTAH CODE ANN. §76-10-1801 (6)(a). In the additional light of the fact that a 
person is criminally liable under §76-10-1801 if false information is merely "conveyed" 
"indirectly" and via "material omission," the vagueness of these terms is further revealed 
in their vague context. Indeed, because §76-10-1801 is so vague and therefore broad, it 
easily encompasses many other offenses, such as forgery, false information to a peace 
officer, prescription fraud, unlawful use of a transaction card, identify fraud, and writing 
bad checks, to name a few. In short, any crime of dishonesty is communications fraud. It 
would seem that the legislature did not intend to punish the person who lies to a private 
citizen about his identity (a second degree felony) more severely than the person who lies 
to a police officer about the same thing (a class B misdemeanor). 
In determining whether §76-10-1801 is void for vagueness, the fact that the 
statute implicates constitutionally protected conduct is dispositive. However, the 
additional fact that the vague language used in the statute fails to adequately notice 
proscribed conduct renders the statute void for vagueness and impermissibly vague in all 
of its applications. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing facts and law, Appellant, Richard Norris, respectfully 
requests this Court to vacate his convictions on the grounds that Utah Code Ann. §76-10-
15 
1801 is unconstitutional in that it is both overly broad and void for vagueness. Mr. Norris 
also respectfully requests that this Court find that a statute's unconstitutionality is a 
jurisdictional defect, and that Mr. Norris therefore did not waive his right to appeal the 
matter when he entered guilty pleas in this case. 
Respectfully submitted this ' f e ^ d a y of April, 2004. 
FILLMORE SPENCER, LLC 
, ,.. / L 
Jennifer K. Gowans 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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